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concord between them. In his chapter on miracles, J.A. Cover distinguishes
between the claim that an event is anomalous, and the claim that an anomalous event has a divine cause. He concedes that the skeptic can always
deny either claim, but that while these options are available to the skeptic,
they may not always be reasonable.
Chapter fifteen concerns Christianity and ethics. Here, Frances HowardSnyder argues against ethical relativism and for a version of the Divine
Command Theory. She outlines some important theoretical problems for
this theory, but urges that the truth or falsity of this theory should make no
practical difference to the Christian's desire to live a righteous life, since
this task involves discovering and following whatever moral rules there
are, not discovering what makes tlzem tflle. The final paper concerns the
authority of scripture, in which Douglas Blount suggests that it is reasonable to believe the doctrine of biblical inerrancy (which, he notes, does not
entail flat-footed literalism). Addressing his argument to Christians, Blount
suggests (perhaps non-controversially) that if Christianity is true, then it is
indeed reasonable to believe that scripture is inerrant. He then notes that
this belief could be rendered unreasonable for the Christian if there were
indeed contradictions or clear factual errors in scripture, but that there is
no clear evidence of either.
In preparing the volume, the contributors met for two weeks to discuss
each other's manuscripts and present their material to lay audiences. Clearly,
this process was beneficial, for, on the whole, the authors skillfully present a
wealth of complex material in an accessible and engaging fashion. One way
in which the book could be improved, however, is by the inclusion of a chapter devoted specifically to theistic epistemology. While many of the authors
are obviously indebted to work in this field by Plantinga, William Alston,
and others, a sustained exposition of certain major themes in theistic theory
of knowledge would be useful to the beginner. Also, the interested reader
would be well served by the inclusion of a systematic guide to further reading on the topics covered. Nonetheless, beginners will benefit greatly from
this unique resource, and specialists will discover that it sets a high standard
for effective inh'oductory exposition of Christian philosophy.
NOTES
1. "Advice to Christian Philosophers", Faith and Philosophy 1:3 (1984), 255.
2. Plantinga, A. "A Defense of Religious Exclusivism", in Pojman, L. [Ed.]
The Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1987) and
Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Love's Grateful Striving by M. Jamie Ferreira. Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. xii, 316. $45.00 (cloth).
PHILIP L. QUINN, University of Notre Dame
This book is a commentary on Kierkegaard's Works of Love. It contains a
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short introduction, seventeen chapters and a brief conclusion. The seventeen chapters cover in detail all fifteen of the deliberations in Works of Love
as well as its preface, introductory prayer and conclusion. The book is an
important contribution to Kierkegaard studies. It also aspires to convince
readers of the enduring value of Works or Love for Christian ethics.
When they think of Kierkegaard's posture toward ethics, many people
call to mind only the idea that the ethical is that which is teleologically suspended in Fear and Trembling, or that which is the alternative to the aesthetic in Either/Or or that which is succeeded and surpassed by the two forms
of religiousness in the fuller Kierkegaardian account of life's stages. But
the ethical in these contexts is to be understood as some more or less freestanding secular ethics, often an amalgam of themes from Kant and Hegel
refracted through the standpoint of one or another of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms. It would be a mistake to suppose that the ethical thus understood
coincides with Kierkegaard's own ethical commitments. By contrast,
Works of Love, which Kierkegaard published under his own name in 1847,
is the primary source for his own views on ethics; it is a brilliant and sustained effort to spell out the demands of a distinctively Christian ethics of
love of the neighbor. What is more, it is an ancestor of much of the work in
contemporary Christian ethics that belongs to the tradition of agapeistic
ethics. Older works such as Anders Nygren's Agape and Eros and more
recent works such as Gene Outka's Agape stand in a line of descent from it.
So anyone interested in that tradition or in Kierkegaard's own ethical
thought must eventually grapple with it, and anyone with an interest in
the broader topic of Christian ethics would be well advised to do so.
Works of Love is not, however, an easy book to come to grips with, and so
it is a work that cries out for good commentary. Part of the difficulty arises
from the way Kierkegaard conceives of the task he wants the book to perform. It is meant to provoke people who are not yet aware of the full measure of the demands of Christian love of the neighbor. As Ferreira, paraphrasing Kierkegaard, puts the point, "these people need to be awakened,
turned topsy-turvy with respect to the limits of preferential love (erotic
love and friendship), but they are already in a position to be directly challenged by the idea of a working Christian love for one's neighbor" (p. 15).
In. order to provoke, Kiekegaard often indulges in rhetorical exaggeration.
Another part derives from the way he exercises his great literary gifts. As
Ferreira notes, "Kiekegaard is an elegant and entertaining and at times
mischievous writer, and often there is no sense in trying to paraphrase him
since his own words dramatically make his points better than any paraphrase could" (p. 9). But frequently the literary bells and whistles-all that
mischief and drama-merely serve to distract and, in my opinion, to put
on display a certain amount of unattractive literary vanity. In short, Works
of Love is very far from being under the control of the passion for sobriety
and exactness that characterizes the best of contemporary scholarly writing. If it is to be brought into a fruitful conversation with work driven by
that passion, a great deal of interpretive charity and a knack for giving
plausible deflationary readings of some of its more outrageous claims will
be required. Ferreira's commentary does a superb job, for the most part, of
reading Works of Love charitably; it is in that sense itself a work of love.
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Ferreira's decision to comment on Works oj Love as a whole helps her to
interpret in ways that combine charity and plausibility. She is often able to
make the case that a passage which, when considered on its own, seems
overstated or just plain mistaken actually makes good sense if taken to be
suitably qualified by things Kierkegaard explicitly says elsewhere in the
book. And since she knows the rest of Kierkegaard's writings very well,
she is also able to use them to good effect in clarifying and qualifying the
claims of Works oj Love. The upshot is commentary that with great success
places parts of the book in the context of the whole and then goes on to
place the book as whole in the larger context of Kierkegaard's entire corpus.
The result of this double contextualization is first-rate textual exegesis.
Another strength of Ferreira's commentary is the historical context it provides for Works oj Love. Looking backward, she compares Kierkegaard's
views on the role of good works in Christian life to those of Martin Luther.
Relying particularly on Luther's Treatise on Good Works, she argues that
Kierkegaard offers a useful corrective to exaggerations in Luther's writings
that stem from his efforts to correct the unbalanced Catholic thought and
practice he confronted. Looking forward, she also connects Kierkegaard's
ideas to themes in contemporary French philosophy. She draws attention
to some striking similarities between Kierkegaard's ethics of dutiful love for
the neighbor and Emmanuel Levinas's account of the ethical responsibility
called forth by the face of the Other. And she insightfully compares
Kierkegaard with Jacques Derrida on the issues of debt and gift and with
Paul Ricoeur on the topic of commanded love.
Ferreira also mounts a spirited defense of Works oj Love against some of
the cultured despisers who have been among the harshest of its recent critics. She responds vigorously to Theodor W. Adorno's charge, set forth in
his "On Kierkegaard's Doctrine of Love," that Kierkegaard's ethics is
abstract and callous and to Knud E. Logstrup's allegation, made in his
recently translated The Ethical Demand, that it is absurd and gruesome. Her
counterarguments to these critics put it beyond reasonable doubt that they
distort and misinterpret Kierkegaard's ethical thought.
I find it hard to imagine that anyone could do a more thorough job of
making Kierkegaard's Christian ethics seem defensible and attractive than
Ferreira has done in this book. Yet I think her efforts sometimes fail to persuade on points of detail.
An example occurs in her discussion in Chapter 14 of the eighth deliberation in the second series, which is entitled "The Victory of the Conciliatory
Spirit in Love, Which Wins the One Overcome." She there attributes to
Kierkegaard the view that "our duty is to express forgiveness even in the
absence of any sign of repentance or even any request for forgiveness" (p.
204). Levinas, as she points out, holds the conflicting view that one cannot
forgive until the offender has repented and sought forgiveness. But
Ferreira does not even consider the objection that, since one cannot forgive
in advance of repentance and a request for forgiveness, one has, by the
"ought" implies "can" principle and modus toBens, no duty to do so. The
only problem for the view she attributes to Kierkegaard that she addresses
is that "there are, of course, dangers in the notion that one should rush to
forgive people before they ask for forgiveness or even acknowledge their
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guilt-dangers of arrogance and conceit" (p. 206). However, she supposes
that here conceit would express itself in forgiving in an unloving and selfserving manner; it does not occur to her that it might express itself in the
illusion that one can do what is impossible.
Moreover, Ferreira fails to show that Kierkegaard actually holds the view
she attributes to him. She tries to clinch her case in the following sentence:
"For Kierkegaard, on the contrary, it is clear that fulfilling the law requires
us to forgive before the other has asked for it: '[I]t is the conciliatory spirit to
need to forgive already when the other person had not had the slightest
thought of seeking forgiveness'; indeed, 'we are speaking about fighting in
love so that the other will accept forgiveness, will allow himself to be reconciled' (WL, p. 336)" (p. 205). But the two passages from Works of Love
Ferreira quotes in this sentence neither state nor entail that we are required
to forgive before the other has repented and requested forgiveness. After
all, there are needs that cannot be satisfied until after certain conditions
obtain, and before such conditions obtain we can struggle to bring it about
or to assist others in bringing it about that those conditions will obtain. So,
given this textual evidence, perhaps a deflationary reading is called for at
this juncture. Maybe the sober truth as well as the view it would be best to
attribute to Kierkegaard is that, before repentance occurs and forgiveness is
requested, we should be willing to forgive and, for that purpose, to help the
offender achieve a state of repentance in which forgiveness can successfully
be both given and received. In the second of the passages Ferreira quotes,
Kierkegaard mentions the acceptance of forgiveness and reconciliation. If
our goal is reconciliation with the wrongdoer and the forgiveness that is
supposed to lead to it is a transaction involving both offer and acceptance,
then we would do well to bear in mind that the wrongdoer who has not yet
acknowledged guilt or repented will understandably find an offer of forgiveness insulting and reject it with indignation.
It may be that God can forgive the sins of those who do not acknowledge guilt or repent. Jesus is said to have prayed to his Father to forgive
those who crucified him because they did not know what they were doing.
It does not follow that we can or are duty-bound to do the same.
Ferreira does not explore connections between Kierkegaard's ethics and
contemporary American or British philosophical ethics. A natural way to
begin this enterprise would go through Kant's legacy. In the first part of the
second deliberation in the first series, entitled "You Shall Love,"
Kierkegaard makes it clear that his ethics is fundamentally an ethics of
obligation. He shares with Kant an emphasis on duty and the stringency of
its demands on us, and there are interesting similarities between
Kierkegaardian love of neighbor and Kantian respect for humanity. Indeed,
those who are persuaded by the careful arguments of Ronald Green's
Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt will conclude that there are very close
ties binding the two of them. Thus Kierkegaard's ethics could fruitfully be
compared to the work of such contemporary Kantian theorists as Barbara
Herman, Thomas Hill, Christine Korsgaard and Onora O'Neill. Ferreira's
bibliography lists no books or articles by any of these philosophers. She
does not make many references to Kant; her index lists ten pages in its entry
for Kant as compared to thirty-one pages in the entry for Levinas. I think
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Ferreira's failure to make contact with mainstream American or British
work in philosophical ethics will limit her book's influence. Even if they are
Christian philosophers, American and British thinkers who have not been
shown that Kierkegaard can be a partner in the conversations that define
ethical theory for them are unlikely to be convinced that Works of Love is of
enduring value for Christian ethics. Ferreira's book leaves the task of showing that this is the case undone.
I confess to being very fond of Works of Love. I think a Kierkegaardian
ethics of the duty to love one's neighbor has more to offer contemporary
Christian thought about how we should live than either the kind of
Thomistic natural law theory endorsed by John Finnis or the sort of
Thomistic virtue theory advocated by Alasdair Maclntyre. So I find
Ferreira's book a particularly welcome and rewarding contribution to ethical thought. Even where I quarrel with its interpretations, J think it brings
into focus issues that merit further debate. And even where I view its
achievements as incomplete, T think it helps to define what remains to be
done. I therefore strongly recommend Love's Grateful Striving to anyone in
philosophy, religious studies or theology who is interested in Christian
ethics. It deserves attention and response from a wider audience than specialists who labor exclusively in the vineyard of Kierkegaard studies.

